Session Descriptions

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Global Europe: Game Over
Soft Power, Hard Power, No Power?
The Pivot To Asia: Implications for the United States, Europe, and China
Syria: Portrait of an Interrupted Revolution
EU-Turkey-United States in a Volatile Neighborhood: Are Key Partners on the Same Page?
Rethinking Food Security
After the Revolutions: What Next for the Middle East and North Africa?
Debt, Jobs, and Growth
Energy Security: Politics, Policy, and Geopolitics
The Afghanistan Endgame
Transatlanticism Today: Are We Still Mars and Venus?
The Eastern European Partners: Going West, East, or Nowhere?
“Global Swing States”: Rising Democracies and the Future International Order
Strategic Defense Under Political and Economic Pressure: Common Challenges, Common Solutions?
Changing Mental Maps: South America, Africa, and the New Atlantic
The Future of Privacy in the Digital Economy
The 2012 U.S. Elections

Global Europe: Game Over?

The European Union is in crisis. However, a more in-depth analysis shows that the European and international discussions on the evolving sovereign debt crisis and the fundamental flaws in the construction of the euro have only scratched the surface of a much deeper and even more intractable set of challenges. What is the real nature of the crisis?

The past three years have already brought to life the emergence of a European Union divided between north and south; between big and small member states; between creditor countries and indebted countries; between the countries in the euro zone and those out of it; between Germany and the rest; and between the U.K. and the rest. Simultaneously, the international standing of the EU and its attractiveness as a global role model for supranational cooperation and regional integration have suffered from Europe’s apparent inability to find credible solutions for its ongoing financial and political woes. Europe today is perceived as a continent in decline, with an aging population, worried about protecting its social model, and defined by its defensive outlook and acceptance of a diminishing role in the world.

The real crisis in Europe is not a financial/economic one, but a much deeper social/political crisis, of which the financial/economic dimension is just a symptom. The paradox of the current situation is that European democracies are more open than ever but citizens feel powerless and disaffected; European institutions are more transparent than ever but they are more mistrusted than before; European elites are meritocratic and more resented at the same time. And although there is no real alternative to the European integration the disintegration scenario should not be excluded.

The process of European integration succeeded in delegitimizing the European nation state but it failed to create a common European public space and common European political identity. This time the most basic disjunction of all in the European project — the fact that a demos must precede, not follow, a state structure and economic integration — has caught up with it. The paradox of the current “disintegration moment” in Europe is that while no major political or social actor openly advocates the disintegration of the EU, the Union can easily become a victim of the current status quo characterized best as policy without politics on the European level and politics without policies on the national level.

Guiding Questions

What is the real nature of the European crisis? Is there an appreciation and understanding of the fundamental challenges among the European political classes?

Will Europe be able to address the underlying problems that have led to the current political inability to deal with the symptoms of the euro crisis?

What is the outside view of Europe’s partners and allies? Are we dealing with a specifically European problem or are we witnessing an even broader phenomenon of liberal democracies’ limits to deal with increasing political disaffection among the electorates and with the consequences of a globalized economy?

How can the EU reconcile the demand for more democracy coming from below and the imperative for common economic policies coming from above?

Could it be that some of the factors that have so far contributed to the integration of Europe can become obstacles for the further development of the project?

The Iran Conundrum: Strategic Challenges and Regional Risks

The Iranian nuclear challenge is arguably the world’s most dangerous and immediate security flash point. Sanctions and covert action may or may not have slowed the pace of Iran’s nuclear program. Regional neighbors and transatlantic partners remain deeply concerned about the potential for Iran to become a nuclear weapons state, possibly in the near future. Iran believes that it is entitled to a robust nuclear program, including all elements of the fuel cycle. But successive International Atomic Energy Agency reports strongly suggest that Iran is pursuing a covert weapons program. Even a small Iranian nuclear arsenal, together with ballistic missiles of growing range and accuracy, would have enormous implications for the strategic environment across a wide region, and could fuel proliferation dynamics worldwide. For Israel, the emergence of a nuclear-armed Iran could pose an existential threat. The Obama administration has stated clearly that it will not allow Iran to go nuclear. Given the range of Iran’s ballistic missiles, Europe would be highly exposed. Even if Iran opts for a protracted path to nuclear capability, perhaps remaining a near-nuclear state for some time to come, the potential for miscalculation is great. If Israel or the United States attempt to destroy Iran’s hardened and dispersed nuclear facilities, the prospects for success are uncertain, and a military strike is likely to create an open account with Iran, with potentially destabilizing consequences for years to come.

Guiding Questions

What are Iran’s motivations?

How would a nuclear Iran transform the strategic landscape in the Middle East and global security? Could Israel and the international community “live with” a nuclear Iran?

Will sanctions impede or reinforce Tehran’s nuclear ambitions? What are the alternatives for engagement, containment or intervention? How will Iran’s neighbors react?

To what extent are transatlantic partners on the same page regarding the Iranian nuclear issue? Can Russia and China make the difference?

Soft Power, Hard Power, No Power?

Soft power was the buzz phrase of the 1990s. It is often taken to mean cultural influence, or the magnetic appeal of a certain model of society that can alter behavior of states and peoples in the long run. In the United States, soft power has been taken mainly to refer to the prevalence of U.S. popular culture. In Europe, it means the attractiveness of the European model as a way of influencing Europe’s neighborhood, especially through the enlargement of the EU. It has also become an identity issue for the EU. In Turkey, soft power has often meant commercial interdependence with neighbors and the model of a secular state in a country with a predominantly Muslim population. In China, soft power usually means some combination of commercial, diplomatic, and cultural influence. In Russia, it often means energy dependence and playing on nostalgia for more orderly times under the Soviet Union as a way of controlling the near abroad.

However, soft power began to appear exhausted as a way to achieve specific outcomes at the start of the 21st century. Neither Europe nor the United States have had much success in deploying their model of society as a way of influencing let alone determining outcomes in the Muslim world. In the absence of an offer of membership, the EU has found it hard to influence developments in neighboring regions to the east and south. The economic and financial crisis beginning in 2008 have further diminished American and European soft power. By showing the fragility of core economic institutions, they have cast doubt on the capacity of the market economy to regulate itself and even raised questions about the ability of democracy to respond to the needs and expectations of citizens.

Hard power proved necessary to achieve desired outcomes in Bosnia, Kosovo, and later Libya, and for Russia in Georgia. Turkey reverted to hard power with respect to the PKK, with only partial success, after having considered softer options such as the “democratic opening.” Hard power proved largely ineffective in Iraq and Afghanistan. Europe was divided over the use of hard power in Libya, with Germany refusing to mobilize military means even for humanitarian purposes. The severe cuts necessitated by the financial crisis have also reduced military capabilities. Despite the doctrine of “the power to protect,” the use of hard power has not been seriously contemplated in the case of Syria. The use of hard power to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons is highly controversial. Should Israel and the United States resort to force for this purpose, there is bound to be a sharp reaction in many parts of the world.

Guiding Questions

Has soft power proved to be a transient concept, linked particularly to the post-communist transition?

Have the United States and Europe lost the capacity and the willingness to mobilize sufficient resources, and to risk electoral unpopularity to make soft power effective?

Does the intractability of many conflicts (e.g. Middle East, southern Caucasus), and the inability of outsiders to achieve desired outcomes imply a certain powerlessness?

Are international relations in the 21st century too complex to allow any single power to achieve the outcomes it desires?

Are countries that have enjoyed generations of peace and are now subject to hard budgetary constraints unwilling to contemplate the use of force, even against countries whose policies threaten their values and interests?

What can be done to enhance the soft power, hard power, or “smart” power capacity of Europe and the United States to tackle the foreign policy and security challenges of the next decade?

The Pivot to Asia: Implication for the United States, Europe, and China

In late 2011, the Obama administration announced that it would shift its strategic focus to Asia. The “pivot,” as it has been described, has amounted to a number of military, diplomatic, and economic commitments to the Asia-Pacific, as well as a stepping up of rhetoric about the position of the United States as a leader in the region. This has included a focus on engaging key U.S. allies and partners in the region, a greater participation in Asia’s numerous multilateral forums, a steady commitment to the U.S. military presence in Asia despite defence cuts elsewhere, and a more expansive agenda on transpacific trade cooperation.

Some have welcomed the pivot as a long-overdue acknowledgment of new geopolitical realities; some have said it is nothing but a continuation of a decades old policy; and others still have criticized the strategy as being unnecessarily antagonistic. There are worries — including in China — that the strategy will serve only to accentuate U.S.-China security competition. In the United States, Europe, and Asia, the pivot has been widely interpreted as a means of countering China’s assertiveness. Some in Europe are concerned that a stronger Pacific focus will come at the expense of transatlantic relations and the strategic reassurances that Europe has come to rely on for maintaining stability on its periphery. Sceptics and critics in the United States fear that the rhetoric is — at best — misleading in its implication that the United States at some point stopped being focussed on Asia, and — at worst — that it makes the U.S. position in Asia look impermanent.

Whether or not the pivot amounts to a consequential shift in policy, the implications of the rhetoric itself are many. It could give rise to a more competitive China, keen to use its increasing economic and military strength to its own benefit, and fearful of a containment strategy that would see its power limited. It could increase the fear of U.S. allies and partners in the region that they need to choose between China, the main economic partner for many, and the United States, the main strategic partner; that their autonomy may be compromised; or that they will be unable to fulfil U.S. expectations. It could cement the idea of European decline in a Pacific century. Or, on the other hand, the pivot may prove to be the only way to sustain the global standing of the United States in an era of austerity and uncertainty and to maintain global stability as China rises.

Guiding Questions

Will the pivot to Asia significantly alter U.S.-China relations? What was the Obama administration’s rationale for unveiling and implementing this new strategy?

How will China respond to the new U.S. strategy and what are its primary concerns? Does it see any imminent opportunities in the United States’ renewed commitment to the Asia-Pacific region?

How does Europe view the rise of China as an economic and military power and the United States’ response? Does Europe share the United States’ concerns on China’s economic and trade policies?

Does the Obama administration’s Asia-Pacific policies in any way alter regional multilateral cooperation and approaches to global issues such as world trade, international development, financial consultations, and climate change mitigation?

What might be the impact of changes in U.S. and Chinese policy in the Asia-Pacific on other countries in the region, such as Japan, South Korea, Vietnam, India, and Indonesia?

Syria: Portrait of an Interrupted Revolution

The Syrian uprising started as a textbook example of a peaceful protest movement, but was then met with a brutal crackdown. While the Tunisian and Egyptian regimes unravelled in just weeks, and international engagement, both military and diplomatic, induced transitions in Libya and Yemen, Syrian protesters have endured a full year of escalating repression with little to no support from the rest of the world. The regime has insisted that “armed gangs” backed by foreign powers (ranging from Al Qaeda to Israel) are responsible for the carnage, whereas the international community is in agreement that the violence is perpetrated by the armed forces of the regime. One year later, the protests have in part turned into an armed revolution, and there are some signs that there may now be an Al Qaeda infiltration.

As dramatic as the Syrian crisis is for the country itself, its implications and ramifications in an already volatile region are tremendous. Virtually all of Syria’s neighbours, from Turkey to Israel, from Lebanon to Iraq and Iran are involved in a delicate balancing game that could quickly be brought to a tipping point by the unfolding situation in Syria. The result could be a further destabilization of the region, and would certainly change the political geometry in a fundamental way.

Meanwhile, Western powers have repeatedly tried to exert political pressure on the Syrian regime to stop the violence against protesters and have urged action at the United Nations. However, the lack of unanimity in the Security Council due to Russian and Chinese resistance has prevented any consolidated policy response or military intervention like in the Libyan scenario.

Guiding Questions

In light of the relatively few defections, can the al-Assad regime be toppled by force?

One year into the uprising, has the Syrian opposition formulated a coherent vision that may be proposed as an alternative to the discredited regime?

Is the Syrian opposition able to convince internal and international constituencies that its message of inclusiveness and democracy can be implemented?

How would Iran react to the loss of Syria, a pivotal ally since the inception of the Islamic Republic? What are the other regional implications of Syrian regime change?

What will it take for the international community to break the deadlock at the United Nations? Is a unilateral intervention against the Syrian regime even thinkable in these circumstances?

EU-Turkey-United States in a Volatile Neighborhood: Are Key Partners on the Same Page?

Extending from Wider Europe to the Middle East and North Africa, Europe’s neighborhood consists of some of the most troublesome regions in the world. The EU and Turkey share this same neighborhood and have common goals toward these regions: peace, stability, democratic legitimacy, and free trade. Across the Atlantic, the United States shares these same objectives and the same view of Europe’s neighborhood. But whether they are on the same page when it comes to the policies to be employed in order to reach those goals is a matter of discussion. What is clearly lacking is a transatlantic strategy and concerted action. Since the Arab uprisings, the long-standing question of how the EU and Turkey can cooperate more substantially with each other, and with the United States, has become even more relevant. The need to contain Iran’s nuclear ambitions as well as the tragic situation in Syria dramatically increase the need for such cooperation.

This session will explore shared policy challenges for the EU, United States, and Turkey in Europe’s neighborhood, transatlantic synergies for tackling these challenges, and mechanisms that could facilitate joint action.

Guiding Questions

Are the United States, the European Union, and Turkey on the same page regarding Europe’s neighborhood extending from Wider Europe to the Middle East and North Africa?

In what ways are policies of the EU, United States, and Turkey towards this neighborhood converging, and what are some of the diverging elements in their approaches towards the region?

What are the strengths and weaknesses of each of these actors for having a significant positive impact on the developments in this region?

Is it possible to devise a transatlantic strategy to reach the goals shared by the United States, EU, and Turkey in Europe’s neighborhood? If yes, what would be the main elements of such a strategy?

What kind of joint actions can be taken to tackle the urgent challenges posed by Iran’s nuclear ambitions and the worsening situation in Syria?

Transforming and Disrupting the Energy Equation

The transformation of the global energy system is at once an urgent necessity and a daunting challenge. Most of the energy we use today still comes from coal, oil, natural gas, or nuclear power. These fuels have generated enormous global prosperity over the last century but at the cost of climate change, pollution, and dependence on increasingly scarce or remote natural resources.

It is possible to imagine a world where the energy equation has been transformed, where clean power is transported from offshore wind farms or solar arrays in the desert to cities thousands of kilometers away, where motor transport is largely electrified, and where electricity consumers and producers are linked together in a responsive, dynamic “smart grid.” It is more difficult to imagine how we will get from here to there, or what a transition would mean for other low-carbon technologies like nuclear power. Legacy infrastructure, sunk capital costs, consumer preferences, public opposition to new power lines, and the slow pace of policy reform are just some of the factors that are tilting the scales in favor of a continued reliance on fossil fuels.

But change does sometimes come quickly and unexpectedly: who would have predicted how the internet would transform the world of telecommunications in less than a decade? Could new applications of information technology or new generating technologies help bring about a similarly radical change in the way we generate, distribute, and consume energy?

This panel will discuss why the transformation of the global energy system is essential and what this could mean for fossil fuels and nuclear power. It will examine the disruptive potential of nontraditional companies and technologies. It will look at the political and regulatory context in Europe and the United States and the trends in investment in the energy sector.

Guiding Questions

What are the unsustainable trends in the existing energy sector? Why is its transformation essential?

What new economic opportunities would this transformation bring? Who would lose out?

What are the new technologies on the horizon that could disrupt the global energy system?

What are the barriers to their development and deployment?

What would this transformation mean for fossil fuels and nuclear power?

Who will be the global leaders in the development and manufacture of new energy technologies?

Rethinking Food Security

Throughout modern history, humanity has largely been able to feed itself. Food prices have declined or remained stable despite accelerated population and income growth. The anticipated “Malthusian trap” where population grows beyond the ability of humankind to feed itself has not materialized. But, between now and 2050, the earth’s population will increase from 7 to 9 billion, requiring a near doubling of agriculture production. This will put intense pressure on the global food system with severe economic, political, environmental, and national security implications. High fertility and population growth are most acute in countries that are fragile, poor, and flash points for conflict. Although incomes are expected to rise in the developing world, growth will be uneven and many individuals will remain hungry and in poverty, adding to instability. Where there is a lack of capacity to manage natural resources and desperation, there is environmental degradation — the depletion of soil nutrients, over-fishing of lakes and rivers, and cutting of forests to provide more land for farming.

Food insecurity encompasses a maelstrom of geopolitical, environmental, and development challenges going forward. Without improvements to the business climate and better governance, the world may head toward a mega-Malthusian trap. The international community launched the L’Aquila Food Security Initiative and committed $22 billion to address food insecurity at the 2009 G8 Summit. But, no one actor can solve food security — it will take partnerships across business, civil society, and government. Such partnerships will help small and large farmers connect with each other and a whole variety of economic activities — R&D in new seed varieties, warehousing, transport, processing and financial services, technology improvements, and regional trade and markets. Food security means thinking comprehensively — in terms of agriculture as well as manufacturing and services more broadly. Establishing rules of the game for sustainable agriculture growth and the economy more generally will take leadership from entrepreneurs, change agents, civil society actors, and governments alike.

Guiding Questions

What kinds of partnerships across government, business, and civil society increase agriculture production and yields given current land constraints?

How can North America, Europe, and development partners more effectively coordinate efforts and what kinds of instruments might help, especially in the face of budget austerity? Can development corridors serve as a catalyst for public and private partnerships in agriculture?

What role do policy dialogues and advocacy have in building better understanding between the public and private sectors, improving the business climate, and modulating regulation to balance public interests and spur investment?

How can governments better align policies in support of food security, including development, trade, energy, finance, technology, and security? Where do innovative and technology solutions exist?

Given the potential dislocations from agriculture transformation and expected urbanization, what are some policy solutions to assist citizens? What role do safety nets have?

h3>After the Revolutions: What Next for the Middle East and North Africa?

More than a year after the avalanche of uprisings that swept through the Middle East and North Africa in 2011, there remains room for cautious optimism. While Tunisia, Egypt, and Morocco were able to celebrate milestones in the form of relatively free and fair democratic elections, Libya required direct military intervention by Western powers. The Gulf Cooperation Council’s direct mediation and involvement in both Yemen and Bahrain have proven its increasing role in the region as the only bloc currently capable of providing political leadership for the Arab League countries. On the downside, over a year after the first protests erupted in Syria, the country continues to resemble a battlefield. The regime there seems to be on the verge of collapse, but it is continuing to push the country towards a sectarian proxy war that could have dire regional repercussions.

It is increasingly clear that the honeymoon phase is over. The world has moved beyond the scenes of determination and defiance in Tahrir Square and has to be prepared to address the urgent challenges, from a lack of democratic progress, ongoing political unrest, and economic decline in the aftermath of regime change to the consequences of working with the incoming Islamist governments. Among the populations of the Arab countries where the revolutions took place last year, disillusionment is setting in and marginalized groups, such as religious minorities and women, are vainly pushing for increased empowerment and the creation of a viable civil society. However, history shows that it will likely require years for the region to emerge from the decades of socio-economic and political standstill. Throughout this process the international community will have to provide support on a broad range of challenges in order to help the region in realizing its full potential. At the same time, the political calculus in the region is undergoing a fundamental reappraisal as many of the established bargains and strategic alliances are about to be reshuffled. Europe and the United States are faced with a change from authoritarian regimes that implicitly supported Western policies to democratically legitimized Islamist governments whose domestic and international agendas might run counter to various Western interests.

Guiding Questions

Has the Tunisian model been successful enough? If yes, why is it so difficult to export it to the other countries in transition?

Is the Gulf Cooperation Council finally a force to be reckoned with?

Should the international community prepare itself for a long haul in Syria and what is it prepared to do?

What are the regional implications of the Arab uprisings 15 months later?

Have reforms in several Arab states succeeded in avoiding regime changes?

Does Europe need a specific policy tool for the region apart from its European Neighborhood Policy?

How will Europe and the United States adapt to having former autocratic allies be replaced with new partners whose democratically legitimized policies will probably conflict with some Western positions?

Debt, Jobs, and Growth

Recovery from the global economic crisis in the United States and Europe is slow and fragile and — although recent U.S. jobs data has been more positive — is not yet generating the jobs needed to significantly reduce high unemployment. Boosting growth and creating jobs is thus the top political imperative on both sides of the Atlantic. But governments are constrained in what they can do, especially since interest rates are already low and unusually high deficits and debt restrain their ability to stimulate demand. Instead of rebounding quickly from the “Great Recession,” the transatlantic partners are faced with the possibility of a prolonged phase of zero or slow economic growth and thus the prospect of a transatlantic “lost decade.” Such a period of economic stagnation would threaten living standards of future generations on both sides of the Atlantic.

Furthermore, both the United States and Europe remain vulnerable to another downturn. The twin crises in the United States and Europe have brought into question underlying growth models of the past decades that relied on the creation of economic bubbles or too much debt. As a result of new budgetary constraints and the evolution of workforces on both sides of the Atlantic, labor market reforms seem unavoidable. EU austerity measures adopted in the wake of the sovereign debt crisis are having immediate and long-term consequences on labor and welfare policies. EU leaders are now committing to “growth-friendly consolidation and job-friendly growth.”

Guiding Questions

How then can Europe and the United States return to a path of growth? How can we ensure that new growth models will be more sustainable?

What could be the new role of government in the economy?

Which sectors have the largest growth potential in the United States and Europe? In what areas are the transatlantic partners competitive and where have they lost their edge?

What role can, should, or must emerging economies play in returning the United States and Europe to a period of growth? Can and will developing countries be a source of growth for the global economy?

In the long run, what will be the consequences of the crisis on the European and American labor market, especially on its youth, and will the sacrifices ahead not have been in vain? Are we really seeing the end of the European social contract?

Energy Security: Politics, Policy, and Geopolitics

Energy security is never just a regional issue. The pipelines and shipping routes that supply European markets with their oil and natural gas bind the EU to Afghanistan, Iran, Iraq, China, Russia, Turkey, the South Caucasus, and the republics of Central Asia. In this way, Europe’s energy geopolitics intersect with a dizzying number of U.S. foreign and energy policy priorities.

Europe and the United States have a shared interest in managing these geopolitical relationships carefully. Initiatives like the EU-U.S. Energy Council, bringing together both diplomatic and energy officials from Europe and the United States, are a reflection of growing transatlantic cooperation on energy issues. Such cooperation is increasingly taking a broad view of energy security, encompassing not just the necessity of securing new supply sources but also developing new energy technologies and addressing environmental concerns.

These energy diplomats have their work cut out for them. On the immediate horizon are such issues as: the choice of route for new gas pipelines from the Caspian Sea to south-eastern Europe, the implications of sanctions against Iran on the crude oil market, the possible role of unconventional natural gas in central and eastern Europe, the future of nuclear power, the potential significance of oil and gas discoveries off the coast of Israel in the eastern Mediterranean, and the ever-present concern of dependence on energy from Russia.

Guiding Questions

Is Europe overly dependent on Russian gas?

What explains the strong U.S. interest in European energy security?

What is the potential role for gas from the Caspian, and other supplying regions in Europe’s neighborhood?

What role will the boom in U.S. natural gas play in the European market?

Do new pipelines southwest of Europe offer the best solution to energy security concerns?

The Afghanistan Endgame

The U.S. and NATO-led war in Afghanistan has entered its 11th year but many in the West fear that their objectives are no closer to being realized. Those objectives — which include defeating al Qaeda and establishing a non-Taliban representative government in Kabul — have led to a focus on population security, economic development, and cooperation with local administrators and security forces. The United States and its allies have also sought to engage with some factions of the Taliban in a bid to find a lasting political solution to the conflict and wean away reconcilable elements. However, these activities are complicated by domestic politics in the United States and European states participating in ISAF efforts, and sharp divergences with nominal allies in Afghanistan and Pakistan.

As a consequence, there remains considerable confusion and uncertainty surrounding U.S. and NATO objectives in the region, particularly after 2014, the date set for the military drawdown and the transfer or responsibility to Afghanistan’s government and security forces. While some see the United States and its allies maintaining an active and extensive supporting role in Afghanistan for several years after 2014, others have interpreted the deadline as marking a complete and absolute withdrawal of Western troops from Afghanistan. Mixed signals have also been emanating from Kabul, which desires a continued Western presence but often expresses its outrage at the conduct of U.S. and NATO forces.

How the Afghan war ends has enormous implications for the region’s stability, for the United States’ security and reputation, and for the future of the transatlantic security alliance. The divergent capabilities and goals of the United States, its European allies, the government in Afghanistan, and Pakistan will have to be reconciled if a lasting solution is to be found.

Guiding Questions

What are the United States and its allies hoping to achieve through ongoing reconciliation talks? What are the prospects of success and what does success look like?

How does Kabul view the unfolding political and security dynamic, and what does the Karzai government believe are key elements to achieving a secure Afghanistan?

What is the state of readiness of Afghanistan’s security forces? What is the likelihood that they will be ready to assume responsibility for the country’s security by 2014? What, if any, role will the United States and NATO have to play after that date?

What is a satisfactory outcome for Pakistan in Afghanistan? To what extent is this at odds with Afghan and Western objectives?

How can European governments and institutions play a more constructive role in helping Afghanistan and the United States achieve their objectives?

Transatlanticism Today: Are We Still Mars and Venus?

In June 2002, Policy Review published an essay by Robert Kagan that kicked off a vibrant debate on both sides of the Atlantic and was to frame the transatlantic debate for years to come. “Power and Weakness” stated bluntly: “It is time to stop pretending that Europeans and Americans share a common view of the world, or even that they occupy the same world. On the all-important question of power — the efficacy of power, the morality of power, the desirability of power — American and European perspectives are diverging.” Kagan’s characterization of Americans as coming from Mars and Europeans from Venus became a cliché of transatlantic discourse, familiar even to people who had never read the article. The political context of this trenchant critique could not have been more urgent: the United States and Europe had fought together in the Balkans and in Afghanistan, but were in the middle of a bitter falling-out over whether to remove Iraq’s Saddam Hussein with military force.

Ten years later, debates between the United States and Europe focus at least as much on the global financial crisis, and on what President Obama has called the imperative of “nation-building at home,” as on the use of military force. But Kagan’s question and its correlates still stand.

Guiding Questions

Can Americans and Europeans agree on how the world should be ordered?

Do Americans still live in a Hobbesian world of hard power — and Europeans in a post-modern Kantian universe of soft power?

Can NATO survive U.S. retrenchment and the “pivot” towards the Pacific, as well as European defense cuts?

If so, what kind of division of labor does the recent intervention in Libya presage?

Must the transatlantic relationship (and NATO, its security arm) be expanded to consider other forms of systemic risk, such as financial contagion, or climate change?

The Eastern European Partners: Going West, East, or Nowhere?

To the east of the European Union and NATO, there are six countries that are still struggling to define their relation with the West: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine, all of them formerly parts of the Soviet Union. The European Union has gradually enhanced its engagement with the countries in the East through the European Neighbourhood Policy and the Eastern Partnership. Most but not all of these countries aspire to EU membership, but the EU has so far fallen short of offering any one of them a membership perspective. NATO promised eventual membership to Georgia and Ukraine in 2008, but it is likely to be a long-term path.

In many ways, these countries have made huge progress in reforms, yet their path toward the West has been limited by several factors. Much of Europe’s political energy has — understandably — been absorbed by dealing with the ongoing financial crisis. In addition, the dramatic developments in the Mediterranean basin have recently redirected attention to the South to the detriment of the East. Also, Russia has on several occasions labelled these countries a sphere of privileged interests. They have been the scene of confrontations with Russia, most dramatically during the Georgian-Russian war in 2008, but also over energy transit in Ukraine.

Although most of the six countries are in the process of reforming themselves, the divergences between them are growing. Authoritarianism and human rights concerns are growing in some countries. Georgia and Moldova have made European integration a priority, but are hampered by the protracted conflicts in the respective countries. Armenia and Ukraine seem to try to balance Europe against Russia in their policies. The jailing of former Prime Minister Tymoshenko has become a major obstacle to Ukraine’s relations with the European Union. Azerbaijan is interested in a relationship based on energy trade, but has little interest in other aspects of European approximation, and has come under criticism for its treatment of the media. Belarus remains a major headache for policymakers, not least after the crackdown following the latest presidential election.

Guiding Questions

Is there a need to offer the Eastern neighbors an EU membership perspective to maintain reforms on track?

What will be the consequences be for the Eastern neighborhood if the pivotal country — Ukraine — falters?

How far can differentiation between the countries go without loss of the overall strategic perspective of this area?

How real are the security benefits of European approximation?

Does Western integration help to resolve the protracted conflicts? To what extent are the conflicts an obstacle to Western integration?

Should the EU’s Eastern neighborhood, where countries generally have membership aspirations, once and for all be separated from the Southern neighborhood?

What should Western policy be toward Russia’s role and ambitions in the area?

Beyond the targeted sanctions regime against Belarus government representatives already endorsed by the EU, what scope for additional economic and political sanctions is there? How much pressure can the EU and the United States really bring to bear against Europe’s last dictatorship?

“Global Swing States:” Rising Democracies and the Future International Order

Since the end of World War II, the United States and Europe have formed the core of an international order based on the principles of open markets, the free flow of goods, monetary stability, liberal democracy, and shared norms of behavior in interstate relations. Despite many deviations, this order has served Western interests well. The past 60 years witnessed a dramatic rise in global trade and investment, the longest period of great power peace in modern history, and a spread of liberal democracy to areas where it had not previously taken hold.

Today, however, this order is starting to unravel. Iranian and North Korean nuclear pursuits have weakened the global nonproliferation regime. China’s currency practices corrode the financial order and its aggressive pursuit of maritime claims undermines widely accepted norms of free navigation. At the global level, multilateral trade liberalization talks are permanently stalled. While the Arab Spring holds out the promise for new adherence to fundamental rights, other developments — in China, Central Asia, an increasingly autocratic Russia, and elsewhere — point in the opposite direction. International negotiations to establish a binding climate accord have failed to bear fruit.

To renew this fraying order, the West will need new and more numerous partners. The most promising are Brazil, India, Indonesia, and Turkey. Possessing large and growing economies, strategic locations, and democratic governments, they bring capability and legitimacy to any international effort. But these four “global swing states” have not settled on a disposition toward the prevailing order — they have yet fully to embrace the international system, reject it, or offer an alternative. In partnership with these powers, the United States and Europe can adapt and renew a global order that continues to safeguard international security and prosperity. Without them, transatlantic efforts to extend the imperiled order will likely amount to nothing more than a delaying action.

Guiding Questions

How do the United States and Europe view the emergence of the “global swing states”? Are there similarities or differences in their approaches?

What role do “global swing states” see for themselves vis-à-vis the rules-based international order?

What issue sets — such as trade, finance, nonproliferation, the maritime commons, human rights, and the environment — are likely to prove most contentious in the West’s relationship with “global swing states”? What are the most likely areas for enhanced cooperation?

How can the global order change in order to attract greater support from the four swing states while remaining consonant with U.S. and European interests?

Strategic Defense under Political and Economic Pressure: Common Challenges, Common Solutions?

The United States and Europe are facing a critical moment as to whether to maintain strategic defense capabilities. Between budget cutting efforts on both sides of the Atlantic as well as the need to maintain operations in Afghanistan, defense ministries are under pressure to reduce costs, downsize forces, and delay modernization programs. Among the likely victim in further austerity measures could be strategic capabilities and the means by which to deliver them. And while strategic capabilities such as nuclear weapons, AEGIS and AEGIS-capable cruisers, submarines, fighter craft, radar systems, and air defenses are expensive, other than diplomacy, fielding military deterrents may be the only way to demonstrate to Iran and other would be aggressors that the transatlantic community remains unified and strong. The issue that truly needs to be addressed is what mixture of strategic capabilities is best for defending against current and future threats — threats that are commonly shared by the United States, its NATO allies, Russia, and all of Europe.

Guiding Questions

How serious are the United States, Europe, and Russia in maintaining strategic deterrent and strike capabilities? Is there a way this can be incorporated into “Smart Defense” plans?

Can actual cooperation among the United States, Europe, Canada, and Russia truly be achieved in a meaningful and trusting way?

What are the political and military consequences of having only a few NATO allies provide the strategic capabilities for the Alliance? How will potential adversaries see this?

What is the role for Russia in providing for Europe’s defense and vice versa?

Changing Mental Maps: South America, Africa, and the New Atlantic

The rise of Brazil, South Africa, and other countries on both sides of the Atlantic could change the future of transatlantic relations. From new energy discoveries to new drug trafficking routes, developments south of the traditional North Atlantic axis are influencing the geopolitical environment on four continents. New actors, above all China, are playing a more prominent role in Africa and Central and South America, and new developments in ports and shipping are influencing the strategic future of the Atlantic. Looking ahead, emerging North-South and South-South connections are likely to reshape the way we think about trade, investment, development, and security around the Atlantic basin as a whole.

Guiding Questions

How significant are these forces at work around the Atlantic basin, north and south?

Can we overcome the traditional constraints on thinking in broader, trans-regional terms?

What do emerging Atlantic actors such as Brazil want from these partnerships? What will others want from them?

What are the promising areas for cooperation, and potential points of friction?

The Future of Privacy in the Digital Economy

The collection and storage of personal information are essential in this digital age. Data is used by all businesses – from insurance firms and banks to social media sites and search engines – and has become a key economic asset. Vast amounts of personal information are transferred and exchanged every day, around the globe, in fractions of seconds. This has transformed the way we provide services, purchase products, and share information, and these exchanges have become an essential driver of innovation and growth.

With these advances, protecting individual freedoms and privacy is a big concern. The regulation of data privacy affects business strategies and government relations. The case of data privacy in the information age is symbolic of a challenge posed by globalization: international market regulation. As companies locate abroad and individuals access foreign markets directly through new technologies, local rules have international ramifications.

The transatlantic partners share a common interest in creating a workable marketplace for the 21st century by providing clear privacy protections for consumers and greater regulatory certainty for businesses. But differences in national privacy law traditions have made regulatory convergence difficult. The European data protection directive, a single agreement providing a standard legal requirement, is in stark contrast to the diffuse system of U.S. privacy laws, which are a patchwork of legislation, regulation, and self-regulation. The failure to resolve transatlantic tensions on this issue area threaten the economic potential of the information age. To remain competitive, our markets need to be equipped with frameworks for consumer data privacy that provide real and effective protections while enabling the growth, innovation, and free commerce that our economies need. How we resolve these differences will shape the way the United States and Europe will do business in the future.

Guiding Questions

Should privacy and innovation be pinned against one another? Or is privacy rather a key enabler for sharing and networking?

Is it possible to create a transatlantic regulatory solution to form privacy rules that are simple and business-friendly?

Whose responsibility is it to provide consumers with understandable guidance to take responsibility for their own information? What should be the burden on companies, on governments, and on the consumers themselves when it comes to privacy?

How can companies provide more effective consumer privacy protections yet maintain flexibility to do so in ways that make sense for their business?

Is the “right to be forgotten” still possible today?

The 2012 U.S. Elections

Over the past few elections cycles, Americans have voted strongly for change, yet their view of Washington policymakers has declined steadily. Voters now seem more motivated by expressing anger over unpopular policies or the state of the economy than choosing between clear policy visions. Elections deliver decisive victories, but seemingly without delivering a specific mandate. The 24-hour news cycle is driving a dramatic view of politics that polarizes the electoral environment like never before. Tea Party activists channeled popular frustration with the course of the country to support Republican candidates in 2010. In 2011 and 2012, the Occupy Wall Street movement spread rapidly on anger over preferential access to power in Washington, though they have yet to coalesce around an electoral goal.

The Republican nominating process has been full of drama and shifting momentum, indicating an unsure and unsettled Republican primary electorate. It is yet unclear how strongly they will rally behind the eventual nominee. President Obama faces electoral vulnerability driven by a weak economy at home. As the presidential campaigns focus on the November general elections, they will present voters with a framework for how to decide what the election means.

Meanwhile, the world is watching for signs of how the United States will approach global challenges and what the outcome of the U.S. elections will mean for America’s role as a world leader. Large questions about approaches to the world economy, traditional alliances, and the future of Afghanistan will be decided during the next administration.

Guiding Questions

What are the key political factors that will determine the course of the 2012 election conversation?

What will the 2012 presidential and congressional elections be about? What question will the voters be deciding?

Given the economic and fiscal challenges facing the United States and the stark picture of the debt crisis in Europe, will the 2012 elections provide a mandate to proceed with any specific plan of action?

Despite the relatively small role foreign policy issues have played in the campaigns, will the world be able to draw lessons from the debate about the medium-term role of the United States as a global leader? What are those lessons likely to be?